Ludwig Wittgenstein and Charles S. Peirce .. find to the possible influence of Peirce on the thought of the later Wittgenstein dates from Filosofia ermeneutica yahoo dating. and microfilm copies of the manuscripts of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Archives for the History of Quantum Physics. 13 Wittgenstein, Dworkin and Rules Maija Aalto-Heinilä, Joensuu, Finland. (2 ) as well. date of knowable nature for the role of the essential prop- erties. Munich, Germany [email protected] The form of life is a concept that of stein, in: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ultimi scritti La filosofia della psi- cologia.
Along this line, Susan Haack has suggested that the root of the uncongeniality between Russell and pragmatist philosophy can perhaps be traced back, at least in part, to Russell's personal hostility towards F. Schiller as a representative pragmatist. Although in Wisdom of the West Russell was to write that Peirce had been beyond doubt "one of the most original minds of the end of the later nineteenth century, and certainly the greatest American thinker ever" Frank Ramsey as link The relationship between Frank P.
Ramsey and Wittgenstein is well known, and Wittgenstein duly acknowledges Ramsey's influence in the preface to Philosophical Investigations: I was helped to realize these mistakes--to a degree which I myself am hardly able to estimate--by the criticism which my ideas encountered from Frank Ramsey, with whom I discussed them in innumerable conversations during the last two years of his life Ramsey had become aware of Peirce's logic through Russell, Schroeder and, perhaps, the detailed outline provided by C.
Lewis in A Survey of Symbolic Logic Thayer suggests that Ramsey may have heard about Peirce's interest in the theory of signs and meaning from Russell References to Peirce in Ramsey's writing Below is a brief outline of the evidence for Ramsey's knowledge of Peirce's work: In Ramsey's long and perceptive review of the Tractatus in Mind, the only person quoted apart from Russell and Wittgenstein himself was Charles S. Ramsey pointed out We know that Ramsey had already written this review before visiting Wittgenstein in Puchberg, but it is not known whether they talked about this observation in the visits of and Thayer Richards, published the next year in Mind, he emphasises that "the excellent appendix on Peirce deserves especial mention" Ramsey was greatly impressed by the extracts from the letters to Lady Welby Houser and Kloesel The Meaning of Meaning Induction is such a useful habit, and so to adopt it is reasonable.
All that philosophy can do is to analyse it, determine the degree of its utility, and find on what characteristics of nature this depends. That is, Ramsey maintains that induction has no formal justification, but this does not make its use any the less reasonable, as its reasonableness is pragmatic Thayer It seems clear that he owed this pragmatic orientation to his reading of Peirce Hookway Ramsey quotes Peirce from the anthology Chance, Love and Logic.
G. E. M. Anscombe - Wikipedia
In "Facts and Propositions" Ramsey does not quote Peirce, but in the final paragraphs, after underlining his great debt to Wittgenstein, "from whom my view of logic is derived", he adds: Everything that I have said is due to him, except the parts which have a pragmatist tendency, which seem to me to be needed in order to fill up a gap in his system.
Yet the point should be made that in this passage, much to the surprise of readers today, Ramsey attributes his pragmatism to Russell, not Peirce: My pragmatism is derived from Mr Russell; and is, of course, very vague and undeveloped.
The essence of pragmatism I take to be this, that the meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which asserting it would lead, or, more vaguely still, by its possible causes and effects.
Russell knew the works of William James, and some of Peirce's writing, but in his publications he had never defended a pragmatist position. By pushing the literal meaning of Ramsey's words, Hardwick interprets it as a statement to the effect that Russell had introduced him to pragmatism, and in fact the superficial description of pragmatism which he puts forward is a paraphrase of Peirce Lastly, Ramsey explicitly mentions the Peircean notion of truth as the final opinion which everyone would reach in the long run, in "General Propositions and Causality", which was among the work published posthumously The conversations between Ramsey and Wittgenstein in Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in Januaryand until Ramsey's death in JanuaryRamsey was not only his most valued counterpart in philosophical conversations, but also his closest friend.
In these discussions, to borrow the interpretation put forward by Monk As Hardwick suggested In "Philosophy", which scarcely amounts to seven pages, Ramsey expressly touches upon many of the issues which would later be extensively worked over by Wittgenstein in The Blue and Brown Books and the Philosophical Investigations: As everyone knows, by contrast to the views held in the Tractatus on the figurative character of language, the meaning of which rests on its logical structure, the later Wittgenstein advocated a much richer analysis of language games, of human linguistic conduct in its colourful wealth and variety.
The first is the absurd posture of the Tractatus, which condemns philosophy to being nonsense, then goes on to pretend "that it is important nonsense!
The second, which almost closes Ramsey's note, runs as follows: The chief danger to our philosophy, apart from laziness and woolliness, is scholasticism, the essence of which is treating what is vague as if it were precise and trying to fit it into an exact logical category. A typical piece of scholasticism is Wittgenstein's view that all our everyday propositions are completely in order and that it is impossible to think illogically.
This last is like saying that it is impossible to break the rules of bridge because if you break them you are not playing bridge but As Bambrough has suggested, when in paragraph of On Certainty Wittgenstein comes close to calling himself a pragmatist, what he has in mind is the practical dimension of thought.
Peirce's habits and Wittgenstein's language games turn out to be alternative expressions for a common strategy of resisting the abstract theorising of much traditional philosophy Bambrough Furthermore, On Certainty can be understood as a defence of critical Peircean commonsensism as against Moore's theory of common sense.
Critical survey of academic research into the relations between Wittgenstein and Peirce The oldest reference I have been able to find to the possible influence of Peirce on the thought of the later Wittgenstein dates from This is a conjecture by the Australian scholar Gasking, in a paper given at the University of Illinois in the spring of that year.
Albert Mullin contrasted it with a personal communication from Bertrand Russell saying that he doubted that Peirce could have had any influence on Wittgenstein.
Mullin himself concluded not only that it was improbable that one thinker should have influenced the other, on the grounds of their utterly different philosophical styles, but also that their thought is complementary rather than similar This would shed light on, though not entirely explain, the clearly pragmatic aspects of the later Wittgenstein Schmitz Along these lines, Hardwick wrote in that the importance of Peirce's influence on Wittgenstein through Ramsey had not been fully explored, and particularly emphasised that What is needed is a careful study of the themes common to Peirce and Wittgenstein.
Such a study would provide a context of interpretation which would add an important dimension to the understanding of Wittgenstein's later work. He found "a fundamental point of agreement in their philosophies" which could be described as two versions Wittgenstein's being the more sceptical, that of Peirce the more optimistic of a common conception of human reason and language, in which these are essentially understood not as the private property of individuals, but rather as thought exercised communally Ransdell When Wittgenstein recalls in paragraph 81 of Philosophical Investigations that "F.
Ramsey once emphasised in conversation with me that logic was a 'normative science'", the Peircean scholar cannot help thinking that Ramsey was repeating Peirce's motto, even though this expression was not original to Peirce, and the idea is to be found in other authors who do not use this expression. This impression is reinforced when one goes on to hear in the Investigations many echoes of ideas, expressions, analogies and comparisons which are now well known thanks to the eight volumes of Peirce's Collected Papers Bambrough Following in the footsteps of Rorty and FairbanksHookway was able to show that Peirce, Ramsey and the later Wittgenstein not only agreed that the vagueness and indeterminacy of the meaning of predicates is benign and tolerable, but all three are to be found defending vagueness, which "is, rather, a virtue--something in the absence of which we would simply be unable to say, or think, or do the things we want" Bell There is, however, a growing interest in the unified or integrating study of the great currents of thought which have run through the philosophy of our century.
In this framework pragmatist philosophy in the Peircean tradition and analytic philosophy, heir to the later Wittgenstein, can be understood as different aspects of an integrated stream of contemporary philosophical reflection. One of the factors which explain the success of analytic philosophy in the United States can be traced back to that pragmatic orientation of American academic philosophy, which takes its main source from Peirce.
From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism.
G. E. M. Anscombe
University of Massachusetts Press. La transformacion de la filosofia. Freeman, Cooper Bambrough, Renford. Bell, David and Neil Cooper, eds. Meaning, Thought and Knowledge. Chance, Love and Logic. Philosophical Essays by the Late Charles S.
Peirce and Logical Atomism". In Peirce in Italia, edited by M. Bibliography of the International Congresses of Philosophy. Le jeu de langage".
The Correspondence Between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby. A Guess at the Riddle". In Peirce Studies 1: Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism.
Essays in Memory of F. Ramsey, edited by D. Meaning, Thought and Knowledge, edited by D. Houser, Nathan and Christian Kloesel. Indiana University Press Monk, Ray.
There was some difficulty in getting a full-size plot, where she could be buried without being cremated first. This was not possible in the new part of the cemetery, so the site finally obtained — after negotiation with Ely diocesan authorities — was that of an old grave, corner-to-corner with the plot where Wittgenstein had been buried half a century before. Lewis[ edit ] As a young philosophy don, Anscombe acquired a reputation as a formidable debater.
Inshe presented a paper at a meeting of Oxford's Socratic Club in which she disputed C. Lewis 's argument that naturalism was self-refuting found in the third chapter of the original publication of his book Miracles. Some associates of Lewis, primarily George Sayer and Derek Brewerhave remarked that Lewis lost the subsequent debate on her paper and that this loss was so humiliating that he abandoned theological argument and turned entirely to devotional writing and children's literature.
The fact that Lewis rewrote that chapter, and rewrote it so that it now has those qualities [to address Anscombe's objections], shows his honesty and seriousness. The meeting of the Socratic Club at which I read my paper has been described by several of his friends as a horrible and shocking experience which upset him very much. Neither Dr Havard who had Lewis and me to dinner a few weeks later nor Professor Jack Bennet remembered any such feelings on Lewis's part My own recollection is that it was an occasion of sober discussion of certain quite definite criticisms, which Lewis' rethinking and rewriting showed he thought was accurate.
I am inclined to construe the odd accounts of the matter by some of his friends — who seem not to have been interested in the actual arguments or the subject-matter — as an interesting example of the phenomenon called " projection ". She wrote an introduction to Wittgenstein's book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicuswhich brought to the fore the importance of Gottlob Frege for Wittgenstein's thought and, partly on that basis, attacked "positivist" interpretations of the work.
Her English translation of the book appeared simultaneously and remains standard. She also edited or co-edited several volumes of selections from his notebooks, translating some of them, for example the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics Three volumes of collected papers were published in Another collection, Human Life, Action and Ethics appeared posthumously in The aim of Intention was to make plain the character of human action and will.
Anscombe approaches the matter through the concept of intentionwhich, as she notes, has three modes of appearance in our language: She is X'ing intentionally She is X'ing with the intention of doing Y or She is X'ing to Y intention with which or further intention in acting She intends to Y or She has expressed the intention to do Y expression of intention for the future; what Davidson later called a pure intending She suggests that a true account must somehow connect these three uses of the concept, though later students of intention have sometimes denied this, and disputed some of the things she presupposes under the first and third headings.
It is clear though that it is the second that is crucial to her main purpose, which is to comprehend the way in which human thought and understanding and conceptualisation relate to the "events in a man's history", or the goings on to which he is subject.
Rather than attempt to define intentions in abstraction from actionsthus taking the third heading first, Anscombe begins with the concept of an intentional action.
This soon connected with the second heading. She says that what is up with a human being is an intentional action if the question "Why", taken in a certain sense and evidently conceived as addressed to himhas application.
Anscombe was the first to clearly spell out that actions are intentional under some descriptions and not others.
In her famous example, a man's action which we might observe as consisting in moving an arm up and down while holding a handle may be intentional under the description "pumping water" but not under other descriptions such as "contracting these muscles", "tapping out this rhythm", and so on.
This approach to action influenced Donald Davidson's theory, despite the fact that Davidson went on to argue for a causal theory of action that Anscombe never accepted  Intention is also the classic source for the idea that there is a difference in " direction of fit " between cognitive states like beliefs and conative states like desire.
Conative states do not describe the world, but aim to bring something about in the world. Anscombe used the example of a shopping list to illustrate the difference.
If the agent fails to buy what is listed, we do not say that the list is untrue or incorrect; we say that the mistake is in the action, not the desire. According to Anscombe, this difference in direction of fit is a major difference between speculative knowledge theoretical, empirical knowledge and practical knowledge knowledge of actions and morals. Whereas "speculative knowledge" is "derived from the objects known", practical knowledge is — in a phrase Anscombe lifts from Aquinas — "the cause of what it understands".
She is credited with having coined the term " consequentialism ".